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Abstract: This article brings distinct strands of the political economy of communication and economic 
geography together in order to theorise the role digital technologies play in Marxian crisis theory. Capi-
talist advances into digital spaces do not make the law of value obsolete, but these spaces do offer 
new methods for displacing overaccumulated capital, increasing consumption, or accumulating new, 
cheaper labour. We build on David Harvey’s theory of the spatial fix to describe three digital spatial 
fixes, fixed capital projects that use the specific properties of digital spaces to increase the rate of prof-
it, before themselves becoming obstacles to the addictive cycle of accumulation: the primitive accumu-
lation of time in the social Web, the annihilation of time by space in high-frequency trading, and affect 
rent in virtual worlds. We conclude by reflecting on how these digital spatial fixes also fix the tempo of 
accumulation and adjust the time-scale of Marxian crisis theory.  
Keywords: crisis, geography, political economy, communications, spatial fix, David Harvey, digital media, social 
media, high-frequency trading, game studies, creative class 
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1. Introduction 
In 1994, US telecommunications giant MCI was busy transitioning the Internet from a re-
search network for specialists and hobbyists to a commercialized communications system 
that could potentially enter the offices, homes, and pockets of everyone on Earth. They had 
long been one of the private contractors managing the pre-Internet National Science Founda-
tion Network (NSFNET) and were about to embark on their own ambitious fiber-optics con-
struction project. Advertising that networkMCI plan was a young Anna Paquin, who appeared 
in an empty desert to tell TV viewers: “There will be a road. It will not connect two points. It 
will connect all points. Its speed limit will be ... the speed of light. It will not go from here to 
there. There will be no more there! There will be no more there. We will all only be here.” 
Capital has always pushed for faster and faster communication and transportation net-
works that would make distance and locality obsolete as the space between separate 
spheres of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption was erased. This fantastic 
desire for what Marx (1993a, 524) called “the annihilation of space by time” was embraced 
by the leading architects of MCI's network infrastructure, with Vint Cerf saying,  
“When you're in a fully networked environment, there isn't much in the way of  
'there’” (Hafner 1994). This sort of millennial, liberal zeal for the  
end of distance and the free flow of ideas has circulated around communications  
technology for centuries (Mattelart 2000). While critics such as Morozov (2012) have  
often noted the utopian desire present in these predictions, such desires arise from real  
social contradictions, and the virtual possibilities of new technologies that often  
come up short (Mosco 2005). These technologies and their effects cannot be  
reduced to mere false consciousness or propaganda for the communications  
industry. Communications technologies really do change the geography of  
capitalism, and digital spaces really do provide new sites of accumulation.
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This is of course not only an opportunity, but also a danger, as crises move rapidly from 
one site to another. Critical political economy asks how the geography of capitalism forms 
and reforms itself to exploit labour anew, and how specific technological and organizational 
changes help craft new spaces of exploitation. We argue here that the digital spaces formed 
by technologies such as the Internet are experimental spaces where capital seeks freedom 
from contemporary limits: Old strategies of accumulation are re-attempted in new spaces and 
new strategies are crafted through trial and error in the never-ending quest to surpass or 
displace the internal contradictions which lead to crisis. The concept we use to describe this 
is the digital spatial fix. We use this concept to find new sites of accumulation and crisis for-
mation. This shows that while the fundamentals of the cycle of capital circulation have not 
varied from Marx’s original analysis, it has found novel methods, appropriate to the contem-
porary historical context, to attempt to escape its inherent limits. 
Capital has long sought what David Harvey (1981; 1981; 2001; 2003) calls a “spatial fix” 
to declining rates of profit and the possibility of over-accumulation: expansion into new or 
under-exploited geographies becomes a way to dispose of accumulated capital or to create 
fresh opportunities for new accumulation at faster rates than before. Digital spaces can act 
as outlets for the same sort of fixes we have seen in the past while providing new opportuni-
ties for exploitation and accumulation. Meanwhile, digital spaces potentially intensify and 
extend those same crises.  
For Marx, capital is value in motion and so digital spaces, like older formations of fixed 
capital, are necessarily sites where that value is fixed in place to allow for value production; 
but that fixity, even if it is a fixity of Web platforms or warehoused servers, eventually be-
comes a barrier to further accumulation in need of a dose of ‘creative destruction’. We will 
describe these new avenues and their interaction with physical pieces of capitalist geography 
below, but our main purpose here is less to catalog every possible strategy and outcome and 
more to provoke economic geographers to grapple with the materiality of digital media and 
for theorists of digital media to integrate their maps of technological spaces with the social 
relations of economic geography. The challenge is to map how and why a communications 
giant like MCI might seek to annihilate “there” and replace it with ‘here’, and what might come 
of their attempt.  
It is important that we not consider digital spaces to be unreal or somehow divorced from 
the material world. This is the meaning many have in mind when speaking of the ‘virtual’, or 
the now-outdated “cyberspace” as a purely representational plane, but neither should mate-
rialists overcorrect and wholly identify, say, the mobile meet-up app Grindr with a brick-and-
mortar gay bar. They are not equivalent and there are things you can do in one that you can-
not do in another, but the interaction between the space a bar takes up on Grindr and the 
space the bar takes up in a building tells us a lot about how virtual space really works. A few 
typed messages and pressed buttons on Grindr will alter the material configuration of the 
bar: people will get up and leave, or come to meet each other for sex in the bathroom, or 
maybe the owner will reconfigure that bathroom to keep it from becoming a cruising spot. 
The digital space of Grindr is thus a space of potential, an active engagement with what the 
bar might yet become.  
This is what we mean when we talk about ‘virtual spaces’: Not spaces of pure representa-
tion or imagination, but spaces of Aristotelian potential, spaces to actualize what-might-be. 
Thus in what follows we use ‘digital’ to describe technologies based in the transmission and 
storage of binary code and ‘virtual’ to describe the more general state of becoming of which 
digital spaces are only a subset. After all, the paper maps that imperial powers used to divide 
Africa into exploitable chunks in Berlin in 1884–1885 were virtual spaces with very material 
effects, just as, from capital's perspective, something like Facebook’s virtual map of relation-
ships reorganizes social life into a form more amenable to accumulation (Griffiths 1986; 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2011).  
Surplus value production is here always still a matter of exploited labour directed by capi-
tal. Value is never merely imagined into existence by financial genius or cultural fetish. The 
old rules still apply even though the methods have advanced. In this manner, we can consid-
er all of Harvey’s “spatial fixes”, and the revisions others have proposed (Brenner 1998; Her-
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od 2009; Jessop 2013) as “virtual fixes”. Different pushes into new spaces will have different 
effects depending on the technologies, state policies, organizational forms, and social rela-
tions involved, yet all actively create new potentials for accumulation. The work that has to be 
done is in deciphering whether and how these potentials are actualized. Like Harvey, our 
perspective on the virtual fix emphasizes and builds on certain aspects of Marxian political 
economy in order to address a specific problem: in his case the historical geography of capi-
talist expansion, in our case the role of digital technologies in crisis formation. Marx empha-
sizes this sort of virtuality, implicitly, and explicitly, in his examination of labour power and 
circulation time. Because of the unique qualities of the labour power commodity it is always 
at risk for potential devaluation as capital threatens an external move (e.g. outsourcing, 
scabbing) or internal development (e.g. speed-ups, new machinery) which lowers the value 
of labour power.1 This is a virtual fix. In circulation the problem is turnover time and the 
struggle to reduce it.2 New transportation methods or means of communication and coordina-
tion that minimize the time assembled commodities rest in production facilities (i.e. “just-in-
time” production) keep capital in motion and reduce the potential for devaluation. This is a 
virtual fix.  
By describing the search for virtual fixes across the materials of capitalism’s history, we 
hope to show that our approach to today’s digital spatial fixes is distinct from those ap-
proaches that attribute to the information economy both a radical newness and an unmooring 
of the means of production from material goods. Digital spaces are still material spaces: 
stored on servers, coded by humans, transmitted over cables or antennae, clicked with fin-
gers. At the same time the precise nature of their materiality has important consequences for 
accumulation and crisis. Information can act in many different phases of the capital circuit but 
it is always materially embodied. As Graham (2013) argues, the ‘cyberspace’ metaphor re-
duces complex networks of social life to a single, immaterial plane. This reduction is useful 
for state or corporate actors trying to justify the tracking and regulation of activities difficult to 
pin down geographically, or proposing purely technical solutions to thorny political problems.  
Our materialist ontology thus makes no Platonic distinctions between physical and digital 
labour or materials. It acknowledges that production and reproduction of humanity is entan-
gled with digital technologies, and that these digital technologies are sites of new forms of 
affective labour. At the same time, it doesn’t privilege them above other forms of labour that 
aren’t directly tied to digital technologies. It is important to reiterate that, like Boutang (2012), 
Fuchs (2012) and Dyer-Witheford (2015) we believe the labour theory of value holds, even 
as labour is increasingly fragmented, skilled, reskilled and deskilled. That so much labour in 
the digital economy is unwaged does not change the fact that valorization is still realized by 
companies like Facebook or Twitter. The question of unwaged audience and user labour was 
best examined and answered in 1977 by Dallas Smythe. We believe his work on the audi-
ence commodity in network television still sets the starting point for understanding the pro-
duction of value in what appears at first glance to be the opposite of the traditional factory. 
Smythe’s work, explored below, shows Marx’s original conception of abstract general labour 
can be updated to take into account these new forms of affective labour (Fuchs 2010). In the 
                                                
1 After all, the labourer is “free of all the objects needed for the realisation of his labour-power” and so must seek 
out the capitalist, who owns the means of production, in order to realize this potential (Marx 1990, 272–273).  
2 “As long as it persists in one of these phases—[as long as] the phase itself does not appear as fluid transition—
and each of them has its duration, [then] it is not circulating, [but] fixated. As long as it remains in the production 
process it is not capable of circulating; and it is virtually devalued. As long as it remains in circulation, it is not 
capable of producing, not capable of positing surplus value, not capable of engaging in the process as capital. As 
long as it cannot be brought to market, it is fixated as product” (Marx 1993a, 620–621). The original German for 
this sentence is "Solange es im Produktionsprozeß verharrt, ist es nicht zirkulationsfähig; und virtualiter 
entwertet." “Virtualiter” is an arcane Latin form that, for Marx, requires its own footnote definition as “potentiel” 
(Marx 1953, 538). Aristotelian philosophy had a strong influence on Marx’s own theoretical growth (Meikle 1991). 
That general affinity, combined with this specific reading of virtual as potential, would seem to vindicate our gen-
eral interpretation of Marxian relations (e.g. the value of labour power, the composition of capital, the length of 
turnover time) as virtual relationships wherein future states exist as potentials that are actualized from the materi-
als of present states, rather than ontologically distinct phases through which something like money or workers 
circulate. Many thanks to Quinn Slobodian for assistance with this translation.  
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end they are the sources of value that are exploited by capital as it is increasingly faced with 
a variety of contradictions, struggles and crisis.  
Indeed, this is the task of any rigorous theory of capitalist technology: To track the histori-
cal, geographic, and sociological development of the labour-capital relation and its precise 
materialization. Too often, such theories emphasize either a sharp break with both the mate-
rials of prior modes of production, erasing the development and repetition of capitalist strate-
gies to resolve accumulation crises, or the labour theory of value on which industrial labour-
capital relations are said to rest, erasing the endless technological advances aimed at con-
trolling, repressing, or extracting labour’s unique ability to produce value. Hardt and Negri 
(2000) are symptomatic of these tendencies. They argue that value is now beyond measure, 
thus making the labour theory of value politically and empirically obsolete, and that labour in 
this new mode of production is largely “immaterial”—either producing a non-physical com-
modity, participating in “informationalized” industrial production, or working mainly in symbol 
analysis (293). Our analysis of new digital spatial fixes, especially the “primitive accumulation 
of time” that develops from earlier, similar strategies, demonstrates that the struggle to cap-
ture, measure, and valorize surplus labour time is still at the core of the contemporary labour-
capital relation. This analysis proceeds under the assumption that “immaterial labour” is any-
thing but (Caffentzis 2007). Work that produces affects is always deeply embodied, as in the 
centuries of “women’s work” required to reproduce capitalism. The informationalization of 
production is always reliant on “dirty” labour-intensive industries elsewhere on the supply 
chain. And service or cultural work always relies on fixed capital projects and always produc-
es commodities that, though they may not be physically tangible, are certainly material in 
their production and consumption (e.g. the millions of working hours going into a big-budget 
video game).  
In what follows we will briefly situate our description of digital spaces as fixes for over-
accumulated capital within the literatures of the political economy of communication, geogra-
phies of economic crisis, and theorizations of the “network society”. Then, mirroring Harvey’s 
description of three spatial fixes, we will describe three experimental digital spatial fixes we 
see operating in the current political economy: the primitive accumulation of time in social 
media, the annihilation of time by space via financial infrastructure, and the rise of affect rent 
in marketplaces for digital commodities. We conclude by reflecting on the questions these 
conceptual foundations pose for further research, especially regarding the links between the-
se digital spaces, the temporality of accumulation, and more traditional geographies of crisis. 
The goal throughout is not to catalog the potential of digital spaces to act as spatial fixes, but 
to model a spatial approach to digital media.   
2. Political Economy of Communication: Concentration, Agglomeration, and 
Commodification 
Communication technologies create new spaces and rewire old ones. Our work specifically 
addresses how capital in its current formation has embraced the space of the Internet and 
the attendant technologies it has enabled. While the political economy of communication has 
long incorporated space as a key concept and topic of analysis, those that need addressing 
in relation to our argument concern the study of concentration, agglomeration and the com-
modification of audiences.  
Studies of concentration tend to focus on the concentration of ownership, rather than 
physical geographic concentration. It not only brought forward questions of vertical and hori-
zontal integration but also the technologies and organizational forms that allow for such con-
centration (Chandler 1977).  Likewise, in studying phenomena such as the cross pollination 
of various boards of directors with board members from other, competing firms, studies of 
concentration revealed how hegemony within industry itself was maintained (Burt 2012; Scott 
2012).  
Our interest in space and its relationship to capitalism, however, is more related to physi-
cal geography then what concentration studies offered, and thus our affinity lies more with 
agglomeration studies. As a method it moved beyond investigations of direct ownership and 
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outright mergers and towards the study of industrial ecosystems in bounded geographic 
spaces, the built environment of industrial production, and how various kinds of capital sup-
plement each other. Agglomeration studies was one response to theories of the “network 
society”, which suggested that communication technologies would implicitly create less reli-
ance on spatial co-presence. Agglomeration studies challenged this, suggesting that regional 
geographic spaces would become more important for capital, not less (Mosco 2009). In this 
way agglomerated industrial development is positioned as a virtual fix, potentially solving the 
crisis of vertical integration. The rise of Web startup culture, alongside the still in-vogue con-
cept of the “creative city”—which emphasizes the comparative economic advantages of cities 
based on scales of agglomeration rather than concentration—would suggest that agglomera-
tion studies provided a powerful analytic to understand the impact of new technologies on 
capitalism’s use of space. 
The commodification of human communication has also been an important area of study 
in the political economy of communication. Dallas Smythe’s (1977) intervention was to spe-
cifically ask what the economic function of advertiser-supported media is. He proposed that 
they produced an “audience commodity”. He argued that prior Marxist accounts focused all 
too often on the media and communication industries as ideology machines, suggesting that 
they were merely a function of the “base” in Marx’s base and superstructure metaphor. For 
Smythe this critique avoids the answers that careful materialist analyses of the communica-
tion industry could reveal. He writes: 
 
This is the threshold question. The bourgeois idealist view of the reality of the communi-
cation commodity is "messages", "information", "images", "meaning", "entertainment", 
"orientation", "education", and "manipulation". All of these concepts are subjective mental 
entities and all deal with superficial appearances. Nowhere do the theorists who adopt 
this worldview deal with the commodity form of mass communications under monopoly 
capitalism on which exist parasitically a host of sub-markets dealing with cultural industry, 
e.g. the markets for "news" and "entertainment" (2). 
 
What follows from this critique is his assertion that broadcast media is, at its core, a realm of 
unwaged labour. The commodity that broadcasters sell to advertisers is the audience and 
their attention. Smythe says that the content that broadcasters distribute is akin to the “free 
lunch” once offered by restaurants and pubs to encourage the purchase of profit making al-
coholic drinks (5). This is not to suggest that the content of broadcasters doesn’t itself have a 
variety of artistic or cultural or propagandistic use values but rather that it is secondary to the 
transaction. In this way, Smythe reveals how Marx’s concept of the commodity fetish func-
tions: the primary appearance of the commodity’s use value (messages, entertainment) mys-
tifies the commodity’s real value as exchange value (audiences sold to advertisers). The au-
dience’s labour time viewing advertisements is sold (Meehan 1993). The audience is then 
“paid” in media content, which the worker cannot actually use to reproduce themselves, 
meaning that the labour is unwaged.  
In the political economy of communication, and communication studies generally, 
Smythe’s work had a lasting impact on how media has been understood, especially juxta-
posed with other popular theories of communication technologies under capitalism.  Broadly 
speaking, on one side stands the interpretation of media primarily as purveyors of content 
and ideology, with either the Frankfurt school’s psychoanalytic and Marxist (Habermas 1991; 
Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) framework or the media ecology of Marshall Mcluhan (1994; 
2008). Theories that utilize Smythe’s work, on the other hand, place this or that media indus-
try into the wider economy and the production of exchange value. It is the latter with which 
we align. For example, Vincent Mosco’s analysis of the disjoint between the ideology of 
technological utopianism and the material economic effects is the core of his work both on 
the early dot-com boom (2005) and his recent work on the realities of cloud computing 
(2014). Studies of audience labour online (Nixon 2014), intellectual property and rent extrac-
tion (Rigi 2014), and the relationship between games and labour (Lund 2014) have all utilized 
Smythe’s typology. In a similar vein, but not necessarily engaged with Smythe’s work specifi-
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cally, Dyer-Witheford (1999; 2015) and Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter (2009) have contextu-
alized communication and cultural industries with theories of autonomist Marxism, commu-
nisation theory, game studies and Deleuze’s (1992) later work. 
Our argument extends prior theories of unwaged labour into a discussion of capital’s spa-
tial advances. That capital, when given the opportunity, meshed itself into the fabric of the 
airwaves—into the radios and televisions of the private home itself—is an example of the 
kind of virtual fixes we are interested in building a method to discover. It should come as no 
surprise that modern social media platforms and other Internet-based services offered for 
“free” are much the same kind of free lunch and unwaged labour relationship that Smythe 
identified in the 1970s. What is important to note is that is that these services engage in a 
spatial strategy that is informed by, but distinct from, prior media forms.  
This then extends into the study of industrial agglomeration, the impact this has on urban 
development, and the development of specific urban governance strategies that privilege the 
development of “entrepreneurial” (often Internet-based or -reliant) capitalism (Harvey 1989), 
often at the expense of those parts of society either unwilling or unable to engage in this new 
economy. The political economy of communication’s focus on the spatiality of ownership is 
also important, in that monopolization and strategic partnerships is a key aspect of new kinds 
of spatial fixes on take place online. Owning the platforms and software is a new virtual fix in 
the same way land rents were a novel strategy at the birth of industrial capitalism.  
3. The Geography of Economic Crisis 
Since the 1970s, a generation of geographers have investigated how crises of capitalism 
develop within and spread across the world market and the built environment. This political 
economic perspective has its roots in a variety of Marx’s scattered spatial critiques. One such 
observation is the dialectic formed between the homogeneity of a world market and the geo-
graphical division of labour required for profitable commodity production. Another is that ev-
er-faster communications and transportation infrastructure are necessary to overcome barri-
ers to the circulation of capital and so function as the “annihilation of space by time” (Marx 
1993a, 524). With respect to crisis formation, the basic contradiction here is that capital, as 
value in motion, must be frozen in place in order for accumulation to occur. This may come in 
the form of technological investment, a particular organizational form, or investment in physi-
cal or social (e.g. highways, schools) infrastructure that increases the speed and volume of 
circulation or the productivity of labour. This fixity means capital is necessarily over-
accumulated locally over time, as the initial opportunities to employ it profitably decrease due 
to capitalist competitors deploying more effective means of production elsewhere, the work-
ing-class organizing around the geography of accumulation, or demand flagging for the glut 
of commodities. Money saved, means of production, infrastructure or labour power itself will 
then be devalued, or new territories of accumulation sought out (Harvey 1981). David Harvey 
describes capital’s geographic dilemma in this way: 
 
It has to build a fixed space (or “landscape”) necessary for its own functioning at a certain 
point in its history only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital in-
vested therein) at a later point in order to make way for a new “spatial fix” (openings for 
fresh accumulation in new spaces and territories) at a later point in its history (2001, 25). 
 
Harvey’s (1981; 1982; 2001) signal contribution to this field was to unify Marx’s spatial cri-
tiques and build on them to craft a theory of how crises can form within some capitalist geog-
raphies and be resolved by others. To do so, he raises interest rates and land rents to the 
same level of priority as wages in the struggle over surplus value. In his “first cut” theory of 
crisis, the struggle over wages manifests as an ongoing increase in machines’ role in produc-
tion and the trend towards the devaluation of that fixed capital. In the “second cut” theory of 
crisis, the interest rate functions as the measure of the socially necessary turnover time em-
bodied in fixed capital and the credit system, as the nervous system coordinating capital flow, 
then becomes a means to displace or delay crises of over-accumulation over time. In the 
“third cut” theory of crisis, land rent is theorized as a future claim on fictitious capital and the 
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means of coordinating those capitals. But this coordination is a site of intra-capitalist conflict 
and fights regularly break out over just which sites, with which relative geographical ad-
vantages, can best further accumulation.  
This, Harvey (1981) argues, is why Marx concludes Volume 1 of Capital with what ap-
pears to be a digression into Ireland’s history as a British colony: because capital is constant-
ly searching for a spatial fix which can resolve the crisis of frozen capital by creating new 
markets to combat underconsumption, by outsourcing production to sites with a higher rate 
of profit, or by the primitive accumulation of cheaper labour abroad. This search for a spatial 
fix, a global solution to local over-accumulation, leads to the persistent displacement of crises 
from one geography to the next. Other researchers have built on Harvey’s theory to argue 
that crisis formation and resolution appears not just as a fix for the location of capitalist activi-
ties, but the scale of those relations: an imperialist push for uneven development succeeded 
by post-WWII Keynesian states succeeded by financial networks focused on regional compe-
tition and transnational corporations (Brenner 1998).  
A particularly rich vein of research has focused the spatial fix perspective on the specific 
questions of postwar urbanism. Neil Smith (2002) argues persistently that the state-assisted 
redevelopment of once-abandoned Western inner cities has been a key site of accumulation 
since the 1970s, especially after the flight of large-scale industrial production from these 
sites. Feminist geographers such as Melissa Wright (2001) find other fixes in the movement 
of certain aspects of production and reproduction from waged work to unwaged housework 
(and back again), as well as the gendered and sexualized aspects of the restructuring of ur-
ban economies. This re-fixing often upsets the established social order leading to the activa-
tion of police powers to ensure the demolition of legacy structures and to manage the la-
bourers rendered surplus by automation or outsourcing  (Wacquant 2009). 
In updating the spatial fix framework, it is important to emphasize Harvey and Smith’s ap-
proach to relocation and redevelopment as both cause of and solution to crises of over-
accumulation, especially in the former’s focus on “fix” as not only situatedness or solution, 
but also addiction (Harvey 2001). But in exploring how capital moves between various sorts 
of physical and digital spaces, we take as a model the feminist Marxist interventions which 
track the movements of the work of social reproduction from home to state to market as a 
sort of virtual fix (Luxton and Bezanson 2006). This approach will become clearer when con-
trasted with some of the dominant theorizations of the present mode of production as a ‘net-
work society’. 
4. Network Society in Crisis 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, 1990s New Economy boosters celebrated a fully global-
ized economy where commodity production became weightless and placeless (Huws 1999). 
A number of researchers, largely sociologists, tamped down on these millennial claims while 
still rigorously arguing for an epochal shift from an industrial society to an information society 
or network society whose main hallmarks were 1) a capitalism with a largely informational 
character, where, for example, the paradigmatic product is software rather than automobiles 
and 2) a global networked geography where places gain command roles not primarily 
through their relationship to the nation-state but through their position in and power over net-
worked ‘flows’ of information. A materialist theory of crisis formation necessarily departs from 
this tendency towards stagism in order to focus on the materiality of technology and the con-
tinuity between modes of production.3 But while the network society critique may lack a uni-
fied theory of crisis—partly because it is hard to imagine an over-accumulation of the imma-
                                                
3 Both Castells and Sassen, the main critics reviewed below, have a background in Marxian political economy but 
their most celebrated works depart from this perspective. Castells for example was trained by Alain Touraine but 
later became a strong critic of Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist humanism. And while Network Society (2009) does take a 
stand against “that dwindling stream of economic theory still concerned with the real economy” (78), its only men-
tions of Marx are offhand dismissals (78, 222). The work itself also engages in what could be labelled idealism, as 
in Castells’ discussion of Internet firms’ market capitalizations as an example of “the creation of value out of our 
belief in the value we create” (161).  
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terial—it is still the dominant argument in discussions regarding the changes global capital-
ism has undergone since the 1970s. Manuel Castells has focused on the social construction 
of space throughout his career but is best known for his encyclopaedic theorization of the 
network as the now-dominant social form (2009). This network society, compared to industri-
al society, is based on horizontal communications technologies and their widespread distri-
bution of culture and labour; the diminished role of the nation state and the rise of the region 
and the transnational corporation in global politics; and new hegemonic experiences of space 
(determined not by place but by network location) and time (determined not by the sequence 
of the clock, but by social and economic requirements to disaggregate and reorder time). 
Castells distinguishes his formulation from common conceptions of a postindustrial “flat” 
world, which are untenable in the face of persistent uneven development. Instead, he argues 
that centres of informational power direct industrial production, and that new forms of ‘just-in-
time’ production would be impossible without networked modes of distribution. The most re-
cent edition of Network Society addresses the 2008 global financial crisis, but does so to 
confirm trends identified in previous editions such as increasing securitization and internet-
worked financial systems. There is not a consistent theorization of crisis or a comparison with 
crises past, but a fearsome invocation of a new financial “global automaton” which no one 
can control (xx–xxii). Saskia Sassen’s (2001) research shows how globalization concretizes 
into command centres for informational capitalism: “global cities” such as New York, London, 
and Tokyo. Such cities are centres for producer services—a sector of intermediary firms in 
the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) industries but also management, design, and 
high-tech maintenance, with a largely business-to-business orientation. In so doing each city 
becomes a “partly de-nationalized platform for global capital” (Sassen 1999, 86). In describ-
ing the agglomeration effects of producer services and these firms’ efforts to denationalize 
some but not all of a region’s economic infrastructure, it becomes clear that networks both 
human and technical are always material and that specific places produce specific networks 
with specific orientations via their emergence in some places but not others (Sassen 2001).4 
Because her study focuses directly on the re-working of global finance following the fall of 
Bretton Woods and the urban gentrification that is a partial result of producer services ag-
glomeration, Sassen does offer a gesture towards links between space, technology, and cri-
sis. There is both a Schumpeterian sense of the necessity of old decline for new growth in 
her description of retail and real estate in global cities, as well as a recognition of Harvey’s 
point that capital mobility is dependent on spatial fixity. But the two critiques do not neces-
sarily join. A description of crisis formation may be beyond Global Cities’ scope but the work 
there does form an important part of a broader critique of the “flow” concept as an immaterial, 
bloodless descriptor of capital hypermobility (see also: Mezzadra and Neilson 2008). 
While the shape and pace of the movement is a matter is of much debate, it cannot be 
contested that capitalism’s expansion has always entailed some forms of both globalization 
and the interconnection of communications networks. Mattelart (2000) argues that networked 
enterprises like railways and telegraphs were the progenitors of a, “capitalism with global 
ambitions”, always accompanied and empowered by liberal ideologies of free trade and free 
speech. Beniger’s (1989) mapping of the “control revolution”5 finds an economy led by infor-
mation processing rather than physical goods production emerging not in the 1970s but the 
1930s, with roots extending much earlier. This is an explicitly crisis-based theory where 
communication technologies help to coordinate and stabilize out-of-control economic materi-
als. For example, regular train crashes demanded a standardized timekeeping system and a 
communications system to manage it, while whole new methods of branding, market re-
                                                
4 Geographers and political economists such as Smith (2002) point out that by prioritizing the role of the global 
city in contemporary capitalism, Sassen may be mistaking command functions for production proper. This is be-
cause the city remains a key site for production the world over, especially Asian, Latin American and African cit-
ies, which did not see the mid-century Fordist-Keynesian compact between state, labour, and capital that Sassen 
describes as weakening in global cities. This charge may be true, but can be corrected by putting Sassen’s global 
cities theory into conversation with critiques of urban production in the Global South, which she does herself in 
later work (2009; 2014).  
5 Not to be confused with Deleuze’s theory of the control society. 
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search, and public relations were able to coordinate consumption and align it with new pro-
ductive capacity. While focused more on communications theory than political economy, Be-
niger's materialist critique of the links between industrial and informational economies is a 
helpful methodological guide for what follows. 
5. Crisis Moves 
Harvey's (1981) original theorization of the spatial fix gave three basic strategies for resolving 
local over-accumulation and impending devaluation, each infinitely variable: exporting capital 
for production, creating new markets abroad to resolve local underconsumption, and increas-
ing the size of the proletariat through primitive accumulation. In a similar spirit, we offer three 
fixes that digital technologies make possible: the primitive accumulation of time, the annihila-
tion of time by space, and the creation of affect rent. Each will be described as they currently 
operate and their crisis tendencies demonstrated. Importantly, we see each potential fix as a 
prototype—strategies which capital will refine and broaden over time. Similar prototyping can 
be seen throughout history, as American manufacturing firms first left cities for suburbs, then 
North for South, then Mexico for China, etc. Or as the Portuguese developed the trading and 
management of slaves on the island of Sao Tome in the sixteenth century before expanding 
to the Americas (Davis 2006). 
5.1. The Primitive Accumulation of Time  
Marx used “primitive accumulation” to refer to the historic movements wherein land-held-in-
common was privately enclosed, feudal were obligations dissolved, and labourers were di-
vorced from spaces of social reproduction and forced to sell their labour to capitalists for a 
wage (Marx 1990). Subsequent re-examinations of Marx’s critique found in it not primarily an 
historiographic commitment to locating the single, original moment of the creation of the Eu-
ropean industrial proletariat. Rather, it reflected Marx’s ontological commitment to tracing 
how the reproduction of the labour-capital relation always relies on the forced separation of 
labourers from the pre-capitalist means of production in order to commodify resources and 
grow the proletariat (De Angelis 2001). Highlighting the ongoing nature of this capitalist vio-
lence, Harvey terms these movements “accumulation by dispossession”. Glassman (2006) 
positions Harvey’s critique within a variety of feminist, anti-colonialist, and environmentalist 
critiques of the “extra-economic” means of accumulation that proceed today in a variety of 
spheres: capitalists’ local reliance on not-yet-proletarianized workers and their resources, 
“capitalist appropriation of the gendered labour of social reproduction” (617), and the enclo-
sure of resources previously held in common. The latter may manifest as the commodifica-
tion of natural resources such as forests, the privatization of welfare state functions and the 
redistribution of that capital in capitalists' favour, or the transformation of cultural traditions or 
genetic information into “intellectual property”. Capital relies on some non-capitalist spaces 
for social reproduction, but regularly invades and restructures others to fix falling profit rates. 
Harvey (2003) sees these capitalist raids of proletarian resources as particularly active in the 
neoliberal era, a shortcut around persistent difficulties with restoring the profit rate within pro-
duction proper.  
We use “primitive accumulation of time” to refer to the profit model of social networking 
sites and most of the free Web: access is free but your activity is enclosed and recorded so 
that your patterns of socialization can be packaged and sold to data brokers and advertisers. 
It is a quantitative development of Marx’s original concept, taking advantage of extra-
economic means of coercion in new social spaces in order to accumulate not new labourers 
but tiny slivers of labour time. Sites such as Facebook maintain their rate of profit by regularly 
changing their interface to maximize recognizable and brand-friendly forms of socialization 
(e.g. the EdgeRank algorithm individualizes Facebook's home page for each user, focusing 
them on the people and brands with whom they are most likely to interact) and to encourage 
such socialization in new spaces (e.g. Facebook’s push to become a universal login for other 
websites and the proliferation of the Like button).  
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This strategy of course predates the current generation of social networking sites and will 
surely outlast them. Indeed, the first dot-com boom was partly driven by a speculative fever 
for the possibilities of gaining massive audiences in new spaces such as America Online and 
then directing them to advertisers or paid services. The free labour of the user is the core of 
the free Web and the free Web is quite lucrative: around $503 billion is spent on online ad-
vertising each year. In 2011 alone, Facebook, with only 4,000 paid employees but with 845 
million unpaid users spending approximately 64 billion hours on the site per year, made $1 
billion in profit at an astounding 50% profit rate (Fuchs 2012). 
This strategy is principally about finding new times for the production of surplus value, 
miniature working days which can be activated in everyday spaces. The social Web is al-
ways on, and its tracking algorithms do not discriminate between work or play, home or 
away, day or night—except insofar as the specific user labour in these spaces and times can 
be differentially valued and commodified. Each scroll, click, and share is an opportunity for 
accumulation of surplus labour time. Facebook’s implementation of the Like button across 
diverse Web spaces is paradigmatic in this regard, though not qualitatively different from 
other social bookmarking icons. Where the dominant image of Web 1.0 was “surfing the 
web”, an aimless wandering among different, disconnected cultural corners, the dominant 
image of Web 2.0 has been “sharing” through Facebook’s white-and-blue thumbs up button, 
tucked amongst content all over the Web. Working under a pretext of social connection, the 
Like button collects users affective responses, shares them with peers, allows content pro-
ducers to syndicate across platforms, and enables Facebook to become a central hub for the 
collection, storage, and brokerage of online affect (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). This collec-
tion can occur over breakfast, at work, on the train, or in bed. And it explains why social net-
working sites have found the mobile Web—where collection is both convenient for the user 
and locatable for the data broker—so valuable and why they are major sponsors for mobile 
Web expansion in developing markets (Talbot 2014). This enclosure of social wandering, of 
surplus labour time that happens any time, is one reason why Web giants like Google are 
making big investments in the “Internet of Things”—the internetworking of home appliances 
and urban infrastructure (Thomas 2006)—so that data points can potentially include not only 
liking a video or searching for a restaurant, but your thermostat schedule or the rate at which 
your milk carton empties (Whitney 2014).  
The capitalist struggle to increase surplus labour time is not new. What is novel is how 
digital media help capture that time during other times, including when the labourer is nomi-
nally working for someone else! The experience is familiar: you either finish with the day’s 
tasks early on or you shift your attention out of boredom. Either way you end up moving from 
the spreadsheet or email or cash register to something more interesting on a mobile phone 
app or on another tab on a browser. Because productivity has generally increased with the 
introduction of new technologies, socially necessary labour time has generally decreased 
and white-collar workers are increasingly spending more of the work-day working for social 
media companies rather than their employer. This is where digital media companies take 
advantage of other employers’ downtime, stealing the surplus labour time when we’re on the 
clock at one job and converting it into surplus Likes, shares, and clicks.  
It is important to note that it is labour time, specifically, being accumulated here and that, 
as in in other moments of primitive accumulation, this is often not freely given. Labour time 
embodied in the commodity form is at the core of the circulation of capital, and the capture of 
surplus labour time is at the core of the reproduction of that circuit.6 This fix does not neces-
sarily accumulate a new, distinct set of labourers who were not previously proletarianized, 
                                                
6 Of course the real measure of value is not just any labour time but socially necessary labour time—and social 
necessity cannot be judged except at the end of the circulation process. Social networking sites may thus be 
“overvalued” not only in terms of their market cap being inflated through financial exchanges largely divorced from 
production, but in terms of over-accumulation. That advertising click-through rates remain low, that web content 
firms so often operate at a loss, supported by venture capital until they can figure out how to monetize a user 
base, may be a sign that they have accumulated millions of hours of user labour time but cannot find a sufficient 
market for it. The hours spent on these sites become the equivalent of unsold cars on the lot. Harvey (1982, 194) 
notes that this “tendency to produce 'non-values'” is a perpetual feature of the internal contradictions of capitalism.  
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but rather accumulates tiny slivers of labour time throughout the day. This fix appears initially 
as an extension of Smythe’s “free lunch” thesis, wherein Web users submit time spent click-
ing, blogging, and conversing to data miners in exchange for free content or social recogni-
tion. But this increasing sophistication is soon revealed as a qualitative development in the 
methods and scope of the ”free lunch” model. In much of the social Web, users make their 
own free lunch: Social networking sites, for example, only host content produced by users for 
other users.  
Users are also compelled to give up their labour time to capitalists online and this compul-
sion, and the subsequent spaces of labour, differ from that of broadcast media not just in 
degree but in kind. This coercion occurs in at least three, overlapping ways. First, as ex-
plored above, the primitive accumulation of time snatches labour time from other working 
days while it encloses other spaces of leisure and socialization that have been forced onto 
the monetizable Web; e.g. danah boyd (2014) describes how teenagers in the U.S. have 
been forced to interact on social networking sites as their access to physical public space 
has been reduced by moral panics, heavier policing, and a changing social geography that 
includes longer commutes and fewer malls and parks. Second, those learning to labour in 
the knowledge economy, at school or on their own, must build a “personal brand” and an 
audience of followers in order to begin to appear employable. Third, life online has become a 
“third shift” of reproductive labour wherein caregivers, who already work waged labour shifts 
and unwaged family shifts, must manage children’s social lives and coordinate family activi-
ties—which might previously have taken place over the phone, after school, or over tea 
(Ammari et al 2015; Portwood-Stacer 2014).  
Such coercion amounts, intentionally or not, to a forced repurposing of the infrastructure 
of social reproduction for a new accumulation regime. As Harvey (1982, 398–405) notes, 
both state-funded fixed capital projects (e.g. roads, schools) and the cultural superstructure 
atop them (e.g. standards of quality parenting) are built up to maintain specific accumulation 
regimes. Their fixity becomes an eventual barrier to increasing profit rates. “The social infra-
structures which support life and work under capitalism” must then be taken apart, moved, or 
repurposed—generally in moments of crisis. Schools and libraries that provided industrial 
training now promote digital literacy, youth in isolated suburbs built on racial segregation and 
the automobile economy connect online as previous meeting places like malls become less 
viable. Parental supervision and coordination that previously occurred on the front porch or 
over the phone is pushed onto Facebook. 
Conversations and clicks are not a priori raw materials of capital accumulation—“they 
want transforming into capital” (Marx 1990, 874). This transformation requires the separation 
of users from the means of socialization and the compulsion to spend free time on Web 
spaces built and maintained for profit. “Free labour” online is thus free not only in the sense 
that is unwaged but in Marx’s original formulation of being free both from being means of 
production (i.e. Facebook owns user data but not actual users) and free from owning means 
of production (i.e. running a site like Facebook requires enormous amounts of capital invest-
ment). The transformation of free labourers’ time into capital is a continual process that “not 
only maintains this separation [between capital and labour], but reproduces it on a continually 
extending scale” (874). This is both an intensive process and an extensive one. Intensive in 
that “the social means of subsistence and of production” (874), the tiny moments of care and 
contact that get labourers through the day, are ever more finely tracked, quantified, and 
commodified. Extensive in that new geographies of social life are constantly brought into the 
free labour process: Other working days, other moments to check the phone, other times the 
labourer’s watch, clothes, or thermostat reports their activity, more and more online spaces 
brought into the same universal Facebook login or under the Like button.  
The extensive movements, where more and more of the mundanities of social life are re-
duced by data mining to simple abstract labour, parallel Harvey’s (1981) observation that a 
spatial fix is often sought via the proletarianization of latent reserve labour at home or 
abroad. These women and children are not initially considered fit labourers but when the 
profit rate falls, and especially when deskilling technologies are available, they can be 
plugged into the system just fine. Breathless press releases about the Internet of Things—
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among other innovations in the primitive accumulation of time—should be read with this in 
mind. The surveillance data from a microwave, a car, or a vital signs monitor may not have 
been worthy of capitalist consideration at one time, but today they are a priority for firms such 
as Apple and Google. These are latent reserves of labour time, and new technologies are 
being deployed to capture them; a tacit admission that the current scramble to commodify 
personal data has reached its limits and new slivers of user time must be accumulated from 
social spaces previously considered worthless. 
This expansion into other working days, and the creation of tiny new working days within 
“downtime”, is one reason why Web companies, and especially social media companies, 
remained profitable investments during the recent recession even while investors remained 
skittish of other sectors and hoarded funds (Lowrey 2014). This digital spatial fix is succeed-
ing and is expected to succeed further. But success breeds competition and technological 
innovation. The race to generate and sell social activity online has led to a number of quick-
fix solutions, many automated: Bots that generate thousands of Likes, scripts that ping the 
comments section of several blogs back and forth, algorithmically-generated comments de-
signed to boost traffic on one site or drive it elsewhere.  
This is the classic introduction of labour-saving machinery under competitive pressure: 
social activity is a valuable commodity but one that can be generated faster by machine. Two 
problems emerge. First, the value of this productive activity cannot be finally realized in a 
sale; the bot won’t buy the goods advertised to it because of its traffic pattern. Second, this 
generates less and less surplus value because, as fixed capital, its future productive output 
is already paid for. Because of the competitive pressure in this exploding market, such auto-
mated traffic makes up between a third and a half of overall Web traffic. Leaders in the online 
advertising community are terrified of the reality that large portions of the data profiles they’re 
creating and selling are not human at all, but the products of machines made to thrive in the 
market advertisers created (Vranica 2014). So-called “linkbait” blogposts and comments, 
filled with gibberish that just links back and forth with other posts, thus signal over-
accumulation and effective demand problems in the Like economy in the same way as new, 
unsold cars sitting on the lot do for the industrial economy. 
With these fake hits and fraudulent traffic, we can see this digital spatial fix beginning to 
crash into its own limits. In order to increase the rate of profit, those relying on the primitive 
accumulation of time may need to excise this fraudulent traffic, thus lowering the mass of 
profits, or find new spaces from which to accumulate users’ social activity. And so the push 
into mobile and “smart” objects or the digital commercialization of “public” spaces such as 
higher education become even more important.  
5.2. The Annihilation of Time by Space 
The second fix is, to flip Marx's famous maxim, the annihilation of time by space. And here 
we move from the everyday play of Farmville or Foursquare to massive construction projects 
such as Spread Networks' $300 million attempt, funded by former Netscape CEO Jim Barks-
dale, to build, in secret, a single-use or “dark” fibre optic cable in as straight a line as possible 
from Chicago's futures markets to New York hedge fund data centres (largely located in New 
Jersey) in order to transmit buy orders as close as to the speed of light as possible and 
thereby take advantage of “tiny discrepancies between futures contracts in Chicago and their 
underlying equities in New York” (Steiner 2010). And while Spread worked regularly to 
straighten, repair, and fine-tune their data pipeline to gain every microsecond advantage, 
they were quickly overtaken by a competitor, Windy Apple Technologies, who had secretly 
completed a microwave relay system that transmitted orders even faster. Similar projects 
linking exchanges and data centres in London and Frankfurt are ongoing (Onstad 2014).  
This is the infrastructure for “high-frequency trading” (HFT): Finance by algorithm at a 
speed no human can comprehend. As Golumbia (2013) explains, HFT is not just marked by 
high-speed networks but also by co-location intended to reduce latency; trading in micro-
level time windows; sending numerous fast orders and cancels; and attempting to end the 
trading day “flat”, with most money made on taking and changing positions rather than com-
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pleting large orders. Large institutional traders deplored this practice initially but now they are 
the main HFT players. Against the grain of some Marxian analyses, Harvey (1982, 377) theo-
rizes transportation industries and infrastructure projects as large-scale efforts to capture 
increased relative surplus value, producing not a physical good but relative locational ad-
vantages. The intra-capitalist competition visible in this particular fix should be analysed in 
this way: Deploying massive amounts of fixed capital to annihilate ever smaller obstacles of 
time, pushing the transmission of data as close as possible to the fundamental limit of the 
speed of light in order to complete exchanges just a microsecond ahead of the competition.  
Like the primitive accumulation of time, the annihilation of time by space is an extension 
and intensification of an older fix rather than a qualitatively different one. Where the annihila-
tion of space by time refers to the reduction of turnover time through large fixed capital pro-
jects, like railways, that defeat geographic barriers to circulate goods as quickly as possible, 
we use the annihilation of time by space to mean the construction of communications infra-
structure to gain a competitive advantage in exchange specifically and financial exchanges 
especially. Speed remains the competitive advantage, but the scale of it, faster than any hu-
man can process, creates a different relationship to spaces of value capture.  
And so with Spread Networks’ pipeline or the expensive Manhattan or New Jersey real 
estate devoted solely to housing servers and connections to Internet exchange points,7 we 
see a very material spatial fix with fixed capital dedicated to grabbing higher financial profits 
through microsecond competitive advantages, irrespective of the assets underlying specific 
financial products (i.e. whether the trade is based in McDonalds or mortgages is largely irrel-
evant to HFT). Railways re-administered time, literally creating new time zones, to link dis-
tinct geographies of production, circulation, and exchange. HFT re-administers geography in 
order to gain tiny slices of time in the sphere of exchange. These are technologies of time-
space compression that, in Brenner’s (1998) terms, re-scale capital accumulation in conjunc-
tion with new political forms (e.g. the railroads of state-managed imperialism, the fibre optic 
cables of transnational corporate capital). Here the re-scaling links monumental, persistent 
spatial projects like skyscrapers and satellites dishes with the fleeting time-scales of auto-
mated financial exchange.  
This competition for time led to an arms race in algorithms and pipelines, to the point 
where, in 2010, “HFT accounted for more than 60% of all U.S. equity volume and seemed 
positioned to swallow the rest” (Phillips 2013). But arms races rarely end well, for armed and 
unarmed alike. And so on May 6, 2010 this particular fix began to crash into its limits as the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 1000 points, about a trillion dollars in market value, in 
around five minutes. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission report on the so-called 
“Flash Crash” blames one large sell-order of S&P 500 contracts for setting off the crash, but 
it reverberated so quickly because of a cascade of automated sell-order responses to that 
larger order and millisecond back-and-forth “hot potato” trades of position contracts between 
different firms’ algorithms (SEC 2010).  
Algorithms operating in the equities market reacted to this turmoil in the futures market by 
withdrawing all of their orders simultaneously, creating a massive liquidity gap which rapidly 
pushed shares of usually stable stocks such as Procter & Gamble to extreme lows or ex-
treme highs—either pennies or hundreds of thousands of dollars per share. Stocks stabilized 
and liquidity returned to the market over the next day, but not without leaving traders, regula-
tors, and the general public shaken. In 2012, the crisis seemed to reappear, as Knight Capi-
tal, accounting for 17% of all trades on the New York Stock Exchange, lost control of an HFT 
algorithm that bought and sold US$7 billion in shares in 45 minutes. Repairing the damage 
cost the company $440 million or 40% of their valuation the day before.   
These momentary crises are shocking for their potential to disrupt the broader financial 
sector but, for HFT insiders, it is overshadowed by a more general crisis in both the rate and 
mass of profit: “Average profits have fallen from about a tenth of a penny per share to a 
twentieth of a penny”, the HFT industry made only $1 billion in 2012 compared to $5 billion in 
                                                
7 The best example of this is the co-location services provided at 60 Hudson Street in Manhattan how trading 
firms jockey for nearby real estate, which can network with the building and gain further advantage (Miller 2013). 
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2009, and about half as many HFT trades were made in 2013 compared to 2011. Knight was 
bought by a competitor, Getco, who revealed in 2013 that their profits had declined 90% over 
the previous year (Phillips 2013). The generalization of HFT technology and the geographical 
reorganization it facilitates means competing firms have basically erased all the “inefficien-
cies”, which HFT was built to take advantage of in the first place. And so HFT firms are now 
forced to seek out new areas—social media rumours, larger bets on future market move-
ment, insider trading—on which to take positions. The pipelines, microwave relays, and 
server farms are too expensive a fix to abandon, and so they will need to be repurposed to 
capture relative surplus value in new spaces.  
Or perhaps the institutional investors will lose all faith in the technology. Or maybe it will 
be regulated into unprofitability. It is important to track this movement and its repercussions 
but for the sake of our argument, the future of HFT specifically is less important than its pio-
neering expansion in the annihilation of time by space. Currently these millisecond ad-
vantages are specific to financial exchanges where that level of competition is meaningful but 
it is not difficult to imagine this strategy becoming more broadly generalized, with resulting 
radical shifts in the geography of everyday life. Microwork platforms such as Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk or CrowdFlower, where users crowdsource the labour necessary to complete 
tasks broken up into minute components such as searching for text, debugging code, or do-
ing simple math, are already supplemental, but rarely primary, income streams for the un- or 
underemployed, especially workers with disabilities or in areas particularly hard hit by the 
recent recession. And these microworkers struggle to grab tasks from those submitting them 
before competing microworkers—who might be a continent away with better Wi-Fi or better 
luck (Marvit 2014). Other microwork platforms take this model offline, with TaskRabbit allow-
ing users to contract out mundane tasks like standing in line or picking up dry-cleaning.   
One could imagine a version of The Bridge, the ad hoc San Francisco squatter’s commu-
nity from William Gibson’s (1994) Virtual Light, overtaken by microlabourers who use the 
proximity of the squat to the city’s Internet exchange point to outcompete desperate microla-
bourers in other locales or to solicit menial tasks from the gated communities on the other 
side of town. Such spaces, abandoned by capital but facilitating the micromobility of labour, 
could become techno-slums, the tenements of the 21st century. The competition would re-
main in the sphere of exchange, with the permanently jobless fighting for the space that 
would let them sell their labour power just a moment faster than the man or woman next to 
them, desperately attempting to move at the speed of capital. 
5.3. The Rise of Affect Rent 
If this speculative image of microlabourers spending their days hitting refresh repeatedly to 
gain access to micro-contracts of semi-skilled work is carried forward, there is also the ques-
tion of what these people do in their leisure time. Recuperation of labour power necessitates 
rest, and that rest often involves leisure. And within play we see another emergent fix: video 
game publishers, distributors and production studios shifting their business models towards 
what could be described as rentiership, in that they derive a portion of their profits from the 
extraction of rents from game players, rather than solely through the sale of the video game 
commodity. We call this “affect rent” and its rise is visible in online marketplaces attached to 
digital games. These marketplaces revolve around the random generation of objects whose 
scarcity is determined by algorithms in competitive multiplayer games like Team Fortress 2 
or Counter-Strike: Global Operations. The commodities themselves take the form of cosmetic 
additions to the game: in the case of, say, Team Fortress 2, they are a variety of silly hats 
that you can dress your avatar in. Yet even in their supposed silliness, the seriousness of 
their existence is underlined by the fact that the Washington-based Valve Software, develop-
er and publisher of Team Fortress 2, hired the economist (and later Greek Minister of Fi-
nance) Yanis Varoufakis in 2012 to help them manage this “hat-based” economy (Varoufakis 
2012). Initially Valve was concerned about managing the valuation of these hats in the play-
ers’ barter economy; but they soon introduced the ability to buy and sell these hats with real 
money, while collecting a mandatory 5–15% fee from every player transaction. What we see, 
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then, with affect rent is the quantitative development of older spatial fixes for rent extraction: 
finding a new space (online gaming), commodifying it using available tools (digital rights 
management, a proprietary platform, and a fully enclosed marketplace) while making opting 
out difficult or expensive. It is not dissimilar to rent increases in dense urban areas, which 
reflect the relative surplus value that is imparted by proximity to cheap utilities, support ser-
vices and an abundant labour supply.  
Here it is important to contextualize and set apart our concept of affect rent from Marx’s 
concept of ground rent. In chapter 37 of Capital vol. 3, Marx analyses ground rent’s direct link 
to the labour theory of value. Ground rent is the “portion of the surplus-value produced by 
capital [that] falls to the share of the landowner” (Marx 1993, 751). Ground rent is produced 
through a very specific social relation, one between the landowners with a monopoly on the 
use of a piece of the earth and the capitalists, which pay ground rent to exploit that land. 
When the agricultural capitalist successfully wrests surplus value from their fixed and varia-
ble capital on the land (their factories and their labourers), the levy they pay to the landowner 
is ground rent. Marx is very clear that this social relation is, most importantly, an antagonistic 
one, with capitalists and rentiers struggling to assert their dominance. Because land is inher-
ently valueless (it is, after all, not produced by human labour) the value extracted from it by 
the rentier is the result of relationships of violence and monopoly. If the capitalist fails to pro-
duce any surplus value on the land, what is extracted from them is not ground rent, but mere-
ly a levy or “simple” rent. Marx also notes that rent in general also serves a purpose for capi-
tal by providing a signalling function for future productive capacity. If rents drastically in-
crease, this suggests that the productivity of capital on that land will also increase. 
Ground rent then, much like all of Marx’s concepts contained in the three volumes of Capi-
tal is historically specific in its scope and aim. It is not what he would describe as a bourgeois 
economic “eternal category” which would purport to explain rent through all historical epochs 
and societies. Ground rent helps Marx place rentiers, who have enjoyed a monopoly on land 
through a historical process tied directly to the enclosures at the dawn of the industrial revo-
lution (Polanyi 2001), in the social relations of capitalism.  
Affect rent describes a quantitatively different social relation, rather than a qualitatively 
new one: that between players/consumers/labourers and the owners of virtual worlds and 
their attendant virtual commodity marketplaces. Affect rent occurs where video game devel-
opers and virtual world owners extract value from the unpaid labour and play of those who 
create digital commodities, whose sole use value is affective8 (Moore 2011). These in-game 
commodities are then able to be alienated by the player for any price (or bartered/gifted) on 
an open marketplace. The prospective buyer pays the commodity owner’s market price, 
which includes a transaction fee (the rent itself) to the in-game marketplace owner to enjoy 
the affective qualities of objects, whatever form they may take. The game and the market-
place itself, make up the digital “land” that video game companies can demand rents from. 
They set the terms of commodity creation—how much time is required to play to get com-
modities; how commodities are created in-game—and the probabilities of the commodities 
being randomly rewarded. In this way the players are both consumers and labourers: their 
play produces the commodity which is sold to other players for real money—with Valve ex-
tracting a rent—the proceeds of which they could then use to buy another commodity. Inside 
this domain of almost total control, the digital rentier then profits off the exchange of com-
modities between players.  
Affect rent is thus distinct quantitatively from ground rent in a number of ways. Most im-
portantly, it is not based around a monopoly over already existing land, which is inherently 
valueless. Instead virtual worlds themselves have been crafted entirely through human la-
bour, relying on human-made networked infrastructures. While we find the concept of affect 
rent most visible in digital games and virtual worlds, we see this this fix is generalizable 
across acts of communication, space and forms of social life. That play itself is subject to it 
just shows how malleable life is to capital. In a sense this is a logical extension of the 
                                                
8 The term “affect” is here used in reference to the expressive, non-material qualities of objects. It is an ontologi-
cal property that in absence of a being to interpret it lacks any function (DeLanda 2006).  
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tendencies that Lawrence Grossberg (1987; 1996) has theorized. Affect rent is a function of 
the “affective economies” he described that have existed in and around mass media for dec-
ades. What is new is that proprietary software platforms have inserted themselves between 
producers and consumers while extracting rents between all kinds of transactions, ushering 
in an age of what some have called “platform capitalism” (Lobo 2014). 
What is taking place is a kind of real subsumption of play into labour, through the com-
modification of the play act itself to the production of surplus value.9 For Marx, formal sub-
sumption is the incorporation of pre-capitalist forms of production into capitalism while real 
subsumption entails the transformation of that production for increased relative surplus value, 
achieved through management techniques and technologies that increase productivity (end-
notes 2010; Murray 2004). Selling games to consumers formally incorporated play, but that 
play is really subsumed when it is itself shaped to meet the needs of capitalist production. 
One way in which digital games are subject to real subsumption is through what Mia 
Consalvo (2009) calls “paratextual industries” (drawing on Genette’s [1997] concept) that 
arise around the video game industry. They create new commodities, markets and consum-
ers, which rely on the original game as source material. Consalvo examines these industries 
through their production of printed strategy guides, cheat sections in consumer magazines, 
and pieces of hardware that enables players to cheat and gain advantage in video games. 
While Consalvo’s concept of the paratextual industry provides a way to describe this industry 
and phenomenon, the spatial relationship that is formed is left unexplored. It’s worth thinking 
about where these paratextual industries arise, and what new paratextual industries will look 
like as capital creates new digital spaces to bypass current limits. These limits were clearly 
visible in the video game industry crashes of 1977 and 1983 as crises of underconsumption 
alongside over-valued assets (Wolf 2012).  
One can interpret the creation of paratextual industries as one fix to a limit: the video 
game industry’s strict reliance on only selling the video game commodity.10 The original 
commodity becomes the basis on which to sell a variety of other commodities, not dissimilar 
to the growth of merchandising associated with Hollywood cinema. Yet such fixes focused on 
merchandising paratexts cannot last forever, as competition increasingly narrows such ad-
vantages in the marketplace. As a result the video game industry has increasingly turned to 
some of the same tactics that broadcast media did to develop the audience commodity. This 
is achieved by transitioning video games from a commodity that contained in its sale price 
the requisite surplus value to realize profit into a medium through which players as audiences 
are commodified for advertisers. This is best exemplified by the transition to so-called “free-
to-play” business models that developers such as Zynga pioneered (Gobry 2011). These 
free-to-play games cost nothing to initially download and play, but always incorporate micro-
transactions that give the player new abilities or in-game currency to spend on in-game ob-
jects and abilities. Recall that for Smythe (1977) the content of the television or radio pro-
gram is what drew in the audience for the real labour that was to be done: watching adver-
tisements. In the same way free-to-play games do the same thing, offering an experience 
that has no initial cost but in return requires the player to often subject themselves to a varie-
ty of advertisements (textual, in-game, or video). 
In addition to creating a new space for the audience commodity (which is more of a func-
tion of the previous spatial fix we described, the primitive accumulation of time) playing 
games itself becomes the source of labour required to develop a particularly unique kind of 
digital commodity. These commodities in digital games take on two distinct use values: the 
                                                
9 Here we use a specifically historical conception of play rather than a formal or ideal one. Play is best understood 
in modern society as the leisure act that exists in relation to the way in which society structures and reproduces 
itself. As Silverman and Simon (2009) say, "in modernity, one has to play because one works, and play in this 
sense, has no significant meaning outside its relationship to work” (354). At the same time it also exists in direct 
relationship with a variety of macro and micro assemblages. For more see Taylor (2006) and Joseph and Knuttila 
(2014).  
10 See Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter (2009) for more on the distinct political economy of video games, which 
shares in common many concerns associated with other media industries like television and film, while also hav-
ing very unique characteristics. 
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first is that which imparts an advantage in the game and the second is purely aesthetic. 
Sometimes, in the cases of online virtual worlds and massively multiplayer games the play-
ers create the commodities themselves (Pearce 2006). This can develop into odd and inno-
vative systems of reciprocity and reward, like the “Dragon Kill Points System” developed by 
large groups of players in Everquest Online (Silverman and Simon 2009). More often, how-
ever, commodities are created by fiat of the company that operates and owns the game. The 
object is bought directly from the developer, or created through an act labour and play, 
sometimes called “playbour” or play-labour (Kücklich 2005; Lund 2014), that is required by 
the developer.  
While this method of in-game commodity production was pioneered in massively multi-
player online games, it has spread out to free-to-play games like those created by Zynga, 
and other genres such as first person shooters (Counter-Strike: Global Offensive) or multi-
player action and strategy games (Defence of the Ancients 2). Valve is a market leader in the 
latter two genres. For a number of years now Valve has experimented heavily with their 
Steam Community Marketplace, which mediates the transactions of all games published by 
Valve, as well as some that aren’t. While many games like World of Warcraft or EVE: Online 
have marketplaces, what makes the Steam Community Marketplace special is that it incorpo-
rates real money transfer.11 Not only can objects be bartered with other in-game objects, but 
they can be sold using US dollars and a variety of other major currencies. This is made pos-
sible because of Steam’s origin as a digital distribution platform for the sale of digital games. 
To buy these games people can either directly purchase them with their credit card or depos-
it money directly into their “Steam Wallet”. This digital wallet is what allowed for the introduc-
tion of digital commodities in game to be sold for real money, because the wallet allows for 
debiting and crediting of the account. With the ability of players to pay each other for their 
digital commodities it also meant that these transactions could now be subject to a mandato-
ry fee, or as we argue, an affect rent, set betweenfive and fifteen percent of the sale price. 
Maybe most importantly, regular users of Steam can't take money out of the Steam Wallet, 
turning their earnings into a form of company scrip. 
The result of this kind of commodity creation is production that is conducted entirely inside 
digital spaces themselves, with almost no connection to what might have once been tradi-
tionally considered productive labour. Yet Valve captures this value all the same. In this case 
it’s a paratextual industry that arises inside the object of the game. Spatially, it is a move 
away from capturing surplus value in the video game production studio towards capturing 
surplus value in the network of players. In this way it has shifted the spatial relationships that 
once defined the video game industry. And it is not limited just to the paratexts of games and 
play: this fix exists in the production of digital commodities in all sectors of life. Currently so-
cial media platforms like Facebook sell “stickers” and other items that can be sent to other 
users. The production of digital commodities directly linked to the production of affect is at 
the core of this spatial fix. They can be as simple as digital stickers or colourful patterns for 
digital items or as complex as deeply personal letters. In the process, if these digital com-
modities can be traded and sold amongst users, the fees that the service and platform hold-
ers extract generalize this kind of rent.12  
Thinking of paratextual items as primarily linked to affect helps conceive of the shift in a 
wider context, where the production and consumption of affect increasingly takes on eco-
nomic importance. Setting it apart from the previous spatial fix, the primitive accumulation of 
time, the value extracted isn’t so much the attention of the consumer—as in the free lunch 
                                                
11 The creation of digital property in games and virtual worlds is storied and quite complex at times. Much as land 
was once the most important asset for early capitalism (Piketty and Zucman 2014), digital land in games like 
Ultima Online and in Second Life was especially important. See Dibbell (2003; 2009) for an early take on the 
emergence of this.  
12 The latter is an extreme example, based in part on Spike Jonze’s 2013 film Her. In it the protagonist, Theodore 
Twombly, spends his days working in a sleek downtown LA office ghostwriting personal letters. In so doing the 
customers outsource the production of affect entirely to Twombly, whose final product is a letter that he hand 
mails when he leaves the office at the end of the work day.  
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model proposed by Smythe (1977)—but in the rent taken from consumers selling commodi-
ties produced for almost nothing, whose only use value is affective. 
The rise of affect rent as a result of the real subsumption of play means that the video 
game industry continues to grow, especially in in its free-to-play and fully  marketised forms. 
These companies, considered by many as the industries on the cutting edge of capitalism for 
their relatively high wages and creative work, have quickly become one of the few kinds of 
businesses that cities pursue with industrial and cultural policy of various kinds, but almost 
always with the aims of protectionist cultural nationalism or job creation (Joseph 2013).  
Alongside these more seemingly prosaic concerns is the likelihood of the multiplication of 
crisis points in these (mostly unregulated) game-based marketplaces as they extend beyond 
the small corners of the Web they currently reside on. Fully subsumed play could become a 
larger and larger part of the contemporary economy, with labour forces dedicated entirely to 
creating or capturing in-game commodities to sell to other players at a profit. This already 
happens, to various extents, with the existence of professional World of Warcraft gold farm-
ers in China, working twelve to fourteen hour days in offices filled with computers running the 
latest version of the virtual world (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009). The same cycles and 
pressures that are created in the pursuit of surplus value are replicated in these new forms of 
labour: relative surplus gained through mechanization and absolute surplus gained through 
the extension of the working day. At the other end of digital production we see a possible 
crisis in the making as the market is flooded with these cheap, likely useless commodities, 
further reducing their prices. Just as tied up in this is the increasing reliance of digital games 
on advertising revenue and data collection. In the case of the game streaming site Twitch.tv, 
steamers who qualify as “partners” can earn money much the way popular YouTube stars do 
(Twitch 2015; Walker 2014). In such cases the contracts of professional e-sports players and 
streamers often depends on the overall ad revenues of such platforms (Taylor 2012). If the 
bottom falls out of these monetization schemes—if a crisis occurs—the house of cards that 
holds up precarious digital labour and play could come tumbling down. In the process these 
digital workers would likely have no recourse due to the elaborate end-user license agree-
ments they are forced to sign to play, while platform capitalists could maintain their positions 
if they can play the same game that rentiers of the past did: revalue their “land” to speculate 
on lowered productivity and devalued capital, and gouge the cyber-proletariat what still relies 
on making their living through digital play. 
6. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research  
Our goal has been to outline how digital communication technologies give rise to new kinds 
of spatial fixes. Our examples—the primitive accumulation of time, the annihilation of time by 
space and affect rent—showcase new, digital assemblages brought about by the intermixing 
of technology, capitalism and ongoing crises in the wider social production of human exist-
ence. Digital spaces are experimental venues for new accumulation regimes, where fixes 
attempted elsewhere are refashioned, redeveloped, and redeployed. Digital labour is still 
labour—even if it is not understood as such by the labourer—and thus is the source of value. 
What is new is that digital technologies create new methods to steal tiny slivers of working 
time from the labourer, exchange the value produced by labour quicker than other capitalists, 
and extract rent from the very pleasure taken in digital communities.  
Our three examples do not exhaust the potential options for digital spatial fixes. Surely 
others already exist or will develop. Rather, our analysis of these examples functions as a 
methodological guide and a conceptual foundation for linking Marxian approaches to eco-
nomic geography and digital media. In his earliest theorization of the concept, Harvey (1981) 
also explored three general examples of spatial fixes: exporting capital to new markets of 
consumers, exporting capital for new, more profitable production, or expanding the proletariat 
through primitive accumulation. Others built and revised these concepts and extended them 
into new social fields. Wright’s (2001) analysis of development in Ciudad Juarez showed a fix 
centred not just on border factories but also on the reproduction of gendered social relations. 
Brenner (1998) focused not on individual fixes but how they connect together to re-scale cap-
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ital accumulation and circulation in the wake of global crises. With these theory-building pro-
jects in mind, we hope to encourage digital media research that is mindful of the critical func-
tion of spatial fixes, as well as research in economic geography that attends to digital materi-
als. This will always require precise documentation and explanation of economic crises and 
their movement between digital and physical spaces. By way of conclusion, we offer some 
possible directions for future research that can build on the methodological guides and con-
ceptual foundations provided here. Because we have thus far focused mainly on the spatial 
dimensions of digital capitalism, these sketches of future research directions focus on the 
how the remaking of space necessarily remakes time. Celebrations of digital capitalism as 
weightless and spaceless also laud a new era of timeless and instantaneous circulation, 
where value is both preserved perfectly and transmitted without delay (Huws 1999). But just 
as digital media have a specific economic geography, so too do they emerge from and pro-
duce in turn a particular ordering of time.  
Temporal patterns of over-accumulation are present in Harvey’s work from early on: There 
is a persistent focus on the temporal delays introduced or overcome by fixed capital projects, 
and his second-cut theory of crisis explored in Limits to Capital (1982) explained the credit 
system as a sort of temporal fix that establishes a socially necessary turnover time to regu-
late various capitals’ turnover time and displace current accumulation crises into the future. 
These earlier remarks on time often merely add the effects of time to those of space and do 
not display either the elegant dialectical reasoning or historical specificity of Harvey’s spatial 
theories (Jessop 2006). Later work such as The New Imperialism (2003) rechristens the spa-
tial fix as the “spatio-temporal fix” and explains the capitalist restructuring of spatial relations 
as necessarily a restructuring of temporal ones. There, Harvey is especially interested in how 
capitalist firms and states invest surplus capital in “physical and social infrastructures” that 
take many years to bear a return, thus staving off over-accumulation in the present while 
remaking a region in a way that will maximize future accumulation (2003, 87–137). These 
massive investments have many smaller spatio-temporal components: logistical projects that 
bring the timelines of production and exchange into alignment, the displacement of current 
crises in one geography into the future of another, and periodic “switching crises” that shift 
surplus capital from primary to secondary or tertiary sectors and devalue those sectors for 
the long-term health of the system. Spatial fixes are necessarily temporal ones. And so the 
capitalist restructuring of digital spaces is necessarily a reordering of the tempo of accumula-
tion, in an attempt to displace, stall, or stave off the timeline of crisis.  
Building on Harvey’s triple meaning of “fix” as a geographic solution to accumulation cri-
ses, a blockage that eventually leads to future crises, and an addiction to the process, we 
hope our description of digital spatial fixes prompts further investigation into the relationship 
between new digital accumulation regimes and older temporal patterns of crisis. Matthew 
Crain’s (2014) analysis of the dotcom crash shows how the 1990s Get Big Fast strategy to 
accumulate as much market share and user attention as possible as quickly as possible re-
lied on risk capital funding that ignored traditional metrics like “negative cashflow” in favour of 
“marketing based asset-valuation models” such as Web traffic statistics. Future financial 
gains were prioritized over quarter-to-quarter revenue and a whole chain of venture-backed 
online advertising firms grew to support this future orientation—and each other—by design-
ing, rating, and selling audience attention. The end result was a feedback loop between 
online advertising and risk capital that inflated the dotcoms beyond any reasonable valuation.  
Many features of this system remain in operation today. But a massive firm like Google effec-
tively integrates the functions of selling, placing, rating and, in some cases, generating adver-
tisements online (Bermejo 2009), both through in-house technological developments and the 
acquisition of firms (e.g. dMarc, DoubleClick, Applied Semantics) that previously worked at 
different parts of the advertising value chain. This would appear to be a classic case of capi-
tal concentration and it may eliminate opportunities for risk capital to insert itself into the mo-
ments of circulation time between different portions of the online advertising economy. But 
does this prevent the over-accumulation of capital in the online advertising economy, or 
merely localize it?  
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Capitalist spaces play many tricks with time, but it is the control and capture of labour 
time, which is of the highest priority. The economic geography of digital media connects mul-
tiple accumulation regimes with differing organizational and technological approaches to la-
bour time, arrayed together to maintain the exploitation of different regimes and the overall 
profit rate.  This is a global problem and we are hardly the first to note the pressing need to 
map the circulation of capital between digital industries with heavy fixed capital requirements 
and hyper-exploited labourers elsewhere in the world. Ross (2013), for example, calls the 
high-skilled digital labourers of the US and Europe and the low-paid factory workers of East-
ern and Southeastern Asia “two ends of the digital chain gang”: One end bleeding over the 
assembly line products that the other end uses to power 100-hour work weeks, neither with 
much control over a heavily automated labour process. Caffentzis (2013) notes that this con-
temporary manifestation of the “transformation problem” is not just a theoretical concern of 
Marxology, but also a crucial problem of development. Profits in industries with high fixed 
capital costs, where commodity prices are often greater than their values, rely on profits from 
labour-intensive industries, where commodity prices are often lower than their values, that 
feed those “developed” economies raw materials and means of production. But where do 
digital spaces and times fit into this equation? Ross’ image assumes geographical separation 
but what about Foxconn workers who spend their leisure time on Chinese social networking 
site Weibo? Do they sit at both ends of the chain gang at different times of the working day? 
And of course, exploitation is not just for hardware production. Facebook’s massive advertis-
ing revenues are made possible by content moderators cleaning Facebook pages of objec-
tionable material and, as explored above, by the industrialized impersonation of “genuine” 
social interaction by spammers who inflate traffic metrics. The Philippines is a centre of activ-
ity for both (e.g. Chen 2014; Clark 2015). A slowdown in these spaces of exploitation would 
surely slow Facebook’s profit rate, but how much? And what is the threshold of tolerance 
before a fix is sought? 
It must also not escape notice that the capitalists and skilled labourers designing the digi-
tal spatial fixes explored above are themselves enmeshed in a more traditional fix that Har-
vey (1989) and his students (e.g. Smith 2002) have long explored: The reinvestment of sur-
plus capital into urban centres, reversing decades of state-aided capital flight from cities to 
majority-white suburbs, powering a gentrification wave, and providing a long-term outlet for 
over-accumulated capital. This shift from a managerial urbanism where cities acted as local 
outposts of the Keynesian welfare state to an entrepreneurial urbanism where cities compete 
to recruit producers, mass culture events, and gentrifiers has been accompanied by a new 
boosterism celebrating the “creative class”. In Florida’s (2003) account, these bohemian ur-
banites, many of them working in technology, are the leading edge of contemporary capital-
ism and are attracted to ”creative cities” whose diverse cultural offerings allow the creative 
class to unplug and provide the raw, cultural materials which these skilled labourers craft into 
immaterial commodities. 
The 2008 crash and the dot-com bubble before it would seem to have disproved the 
common sense that creative sectors would save postindustrial economies, especially in ur-
ban centres. But Florida (2011) used the crisis to retrench his theory, explicitly linking it with 
Harvey’s spatial fix argument by asserting that the real estate crisis signalled the failure of 
the postwar suburban spatial fix and the need for a new one focused on urban infrastructure, 
digital technologies, and flexible working hours. But by focusing on the spatial fix only as a 
geographic solution to past crises and not as a cause of future crises or the addiction to re-
peat them or expand beyond them, Florida inadvertently proves that the push to reorganize 
urban space for technology workers and related creatives is the latest, most prominent ex-
ample of entrepreneurial cities desperate for a fix.  
Peck (2005) argues that creative cities placemaking may just be a post-facto endorsement 
of already-ongoing gentrification, making real estate and retail investment appear as an in-
vestment in productive capacity. But Harvey’s (2003) approach points to another possible 
interpretation: that these different fixes are evidence of a switching crisis in action. Technolo-
gy firms flush with cash may be, with the help of municipal governments, building buildings 
because they want to switch capital out of digital accumulation circuits and into dependable, 
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long-term real estate investments. One example could be SalesForce’s new skyscraper at 
the centre of San Francisco's Transbay redevelopment plan (Roose 2014). Another could be 
the fight between Google and LinkedIn to redevelop North Bayshore (Donato-Weinstein 
2015). These developments may signal capital’s recognition that certain digital spatial fixes 
have reached their limits, that there is a need to shift the accumulated surplus from the short-
term horizons of the Web (e.g., Google’s $59 billion in cash reserves were, in 2013, larger 
than those of the US) into the fixity of roads and buildings. 
It is important to trace these links between digital and brick-and-mortar capitalist geogra-
phies because of the real danger that digital labour will only be seen from the perspective of 
those like Florida today or MCI in the 1990s, who reduce labour to immaterial categories like 
“creativity” and mystify the processes at work. Florida’s use of the “fix” terminology as a solu-
tion to new problems but not as a function of an addiction to an ongoing cycle is thus not an 
individual oversight or error in theoretical orthodoxy, but a symptom of a larger problem. A 
problem where the digital economy is breathlessly treated as a sharp break with the historical 
landscape of labour (as in the theories of the network society, post-industrial society, post-
fordism, etc) and, in extreme cases, with time and space themselves.  
But digital geographies are always material: based in the exploitation of living labour and 
the concretization in the dead labour of machines and circuit boards. The digital vistas ex-
plored by players in World of Warcraft and the prosaic Facebook viewed while riding the bus 
are made possible only through the intense energy consumption of the data centres which 
double as “factories” for the production of value in the 21st century. For example, in 2009 it 
was estimated that World of Warcraft relied on over twenty thousand individual servers, all 
provided by AT&T (Miller 2009). And it should not be forgotten that it is both the outdated 
computers from these data centres as well as the computers the games are played on that 
end up in e-waste dumps around the globe, their precious metals melted down using medie-
val style smelting techniques by local slum dwellers (Greaves 2011). That capitalism is 
based on exploitation is not only a political proposition, but also an empirical demand that 
new forms of exploitation and their interaction with older models of accumulation be rigorous-
ly confronted and mapped across bodies and bits, time and space. 
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